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  OPINION
                             
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Welch also raises seven other grounds on appeal: 1) the1
evidence was insufficient to sustain any of his convictions; 2)
the District Court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that a
Section 287 violation requires proof of an intent to defraud; 3)
the Court erred in allowing a lay witness to testify about
Welch’s handwriting; 4) it improperly allowed a witness to
offer an in-court identification of Welch; 5) it erred in
enhancing Welch’s Sentencing Guidelines range for his alleged
role as an organizer or a leader; 6) it should not have enhanced
Welch’s Sentencing Guidelines range for the purported
3
Appellants John Saybolt and Kenneth Welch were
convicted of crimes stemming from their participation in a
conspiracy to file multiple false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims
with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 286, 287, and 2.  On appeal, both challenge the
District Court’s failure to dismiss the Indictment on the grounds
that it did not allege materiality, which they argue is an essential
element of both Sections 286 and 287.  Welch also asserts that
the District Court committed reversible error by not instructing
the jury on materiality.  Based on our reading of the statutory
language and the relevant case law, we hold that materiality is
an essential element of the charged Section 286 offense, but is
not required to show a Section 287 violation.  Nevertheless, we
will affirm Appellants’ convictions and sentences because the
Indictment sufficiently alleged facts that warrant an inference of
materiality, and the deficiency in the jury instructions was
harmless error.1
sophisticated means used to commit the crimes; and 7) it
imposed an otherwise unreasonable sentence.  We have
carefully reviewed the record and the applicable law, and see no




On October 25, 2005, a grand jury indicted Welch and
Saybolt on one count each of conspiring to defraud the United
States by obtaining and aiding others to obtain the payment of
false, fictitious, and fraudulent tax refunds, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 286, and thirty-five counts each of making and
presenting, and aiding and abetting the making and presenting
of, false, fictitious, and fraudulent tax returns to the IRS, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 287 and 2.  The Indictment alleged
that, from 1997 to 2003, Welch and Saybolt filed tax returns that
falsely claimed refunds for 1) excess federal wage withholdings
and 2) excise taxes on gasoline use in fake farming and fishing
businesses.  Welch and Saybolt also allegedly solicited and
obtained from third parties the identification information
necessary to file the returns—which included names, addresses,
dates of birth, and social security numbers—in exchange for
some or all of the proceeds from the refund checks.  All tolled,
Welch and Saybolt allegedly claimed about $534,476 in
undeserved refunds for individuals and entities from
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Massachusetts, and New York, of which
the IRS paid approximately $223,052.
5Before trial, Saybolt filed a motion to dismiss the
Indictment for failing to charge materiality as an element of the
alleged violations of Sections 286 and 287.  The District Court
denied Saybolt’s motion, holding that following United States
v. Neder, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), and United States v. Wells, 519
U.S. 482 (1997), Sections 286 and 287 neither explicitly nor
implicitly included materiality as an element of the offense.
Focusing its analysis on Section 287, the Court pointed out that
while Neder and Wells “conclude[d] that fraud crimes include
an implied element of materiality,” the statute “prohibits making
a claim ‘knowing such claim to be false, fictitious or
fraudulent.’”  The Court reasoned that the disjunctive connector
gave the Government the option of charging prohibited acts that
both included materiality—making or presenting fraudulent
claims—and those that did not—making or presenting false and
fictitious claims.  Accordingly, the District Court concluded that
materiality was not an essential element of either Sections 286
or 287.
On January 8, 2007, the Appellants’ joint jury trial began.
During the trial, the Government adduced evidence that in 1996
the Appellants met each other when they were both incarcerated
in the same Pennsylvania prison.  While in prison, Welch
recruited other prisoners to participate in a scheme to file false
tax returns.  After he was released, Saybolt obtained names and
identifying information from individuals by promising that he
could get them money with that information.  Welch then
prepared the false tax returns using the information that Saybolt
6obtained.  These returns either claimed that the individual was
entitled to a refund for excess federal wage withholdings, or that
the individual was a fisherman entitled to a credit for federal
taxes paid on fuel used for business.  When the IRS issued a
refund check, Saybolt would split the proceeds into thirds: one-
third to the individual providing the identifying information,
one-third to Welch, and one-third for himself.
Before the end of the trial, the Court, upon the
Government’s motion, dismissed six of the thirty-five counts
alleging violations of Sections 287 and 2 against Saybolt.  The
Court also denied the Appellants’ request to instruct the jury that
materiality was a required element of all the offenses charged.
The jury found the Appellants guilty of all remaining
charges.  After the jury’s verdict, Welch filed a Motion for a
New Trial and Motion to Arrest Judgment that, inter alia,
joined, for the first time, in Saybolt’s pretrial argument that the
Indictment was insufficient in failing to allege materiality.  The
District Court denied Welch’s motion, dismissing Welch’s
challenge to the Indictment for the same reasons it rejected
Saybolt’s.
The Court sentenced Saybolt to forty-eight months of
imprisonment and three years of supervised release, and ordered
him to pay a $3,000 special assessment, $1,000 fine, and
$145,525 in restitution.  The Court sentenced Welch to 120
months of imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release, and
7ordered him to pay a $3,600 special assessment and $145,525 in
restitution.  The Appellants filed timely appeals.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §
3231, and we have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28
U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of both the sufficiency of the
Indictment and the District Court’s failure to instruct the jury on
materiality is plenary. United States v. Yusuf, 536 F.3d 178, 184
(3d Cir. 2008) (“The ‘sufficiency of an indictment to charge an
offense is a legal question subject to plenary review.’”  (quoting
United States v. Conley, 37 F.3d 970, 975 n.9 (3d Cir. 1994)));
United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“Because [the defendant’s] challenge to the jury instructions
turns on a matter of statutory interpretation, our review is
plenary as to that issue.”).
III.
The Appellants’ challenge to the sufficiency of the
Indictment and Welch’s jury instruction claim share one
common issue: whether violations of Sections 286 and 287
always require proof of materiality.  Accordingly, we begin our
analysis with a review of the two statutes.
8A.
“[W]e first look to the text of the statutes at issue to
discern whether they require a showing of materiality.”  United
States v. Neder, 527 U.S. 1, 20 (1999).  All parties agree that
neither Sections 286 nor 287 explicitly mentions materiality.
But “‘[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated
settled meaning under . . . the common law, a court must infer,
unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to
incorporate the established meaning of these terms.’”  Id. at 21
(quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322
(1992)).  At this point in our analysis, two Supreme Court cases
are of particular relevance: 1) in Neder, the Court held that “the
common law could not have conceived of ‘fraud’ without proof
of materiality,” id. at 22; and 2) in United States v. Wells, 519
U.S. 482 (1997), the Court determined that the term “false
statement” did not have a settled common law meaning that
required proof of materiality, see id. at 491; see also Neder, 527
U.S. at 23 n.7 (“[T]he term ‘false statement’ does not imply a
materiality requirement . . . .”  (citing Wells, 519 U.S. at 491)).
B.
Section 287 provides:
Whoever makes or presents to any person or
officer in the civil, military, or naval service of
the United States, or to any department or agency
9thereof, any claim upon or against the United
States, or any department or agency thereof,
knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or
fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not more than five
years and shall be subject to a fine in the amount
provided in this title.
18 U.S.C. § 287.  All parties agree that, following Neder and
Wells, Section 287’s inclusion of the term “fraudulent” suggests
the incorporation of a materiality requirement.  The parties
disagree, however, on the extent of such an incorporation.
According to the Government, the use of the disjunctive
connector “or” between the terms “false,” “fictitious,” and
“fraudulent” compels one conclusion: proof of materiality is not
always necessary to establish a Section 287 violation.  We agree.
“Canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected
by a disjunctive be given separate meanings unless the context
dictates otherwise . . . .”  Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330, 339 (1979).  Here, Section 287 connects the terms “false,”
“fictitious,” and “fraudulent” with the disjunctive “or.”  Giving
these terms separate meanings, we read Section 287 to demand
a showing that the claim was known to be either “fraudulent,”
which would require proof of materiality, or “false” or
“fictitious,” which would not require proof of materiality.  This
means that proof of materiality is not always required to
establish a Section 287 violation.
10
Our reading of Section 287 is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the phrase “false or
fraudulent” used in other statutes.  In Neder, the Government
argued that the presence of the term “material” in some federal
fraud statutes but not others indicated that materiality should not
be implied where the term was absent.  527 U.S. at 23 n.7.
Specifically, it pointed to 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(4)(A), which
“prohibit[s] the furnishing of ‘false or fraudulent material
information’ in documents required under federal drug laws”
and 26 U.S.C. § 6700(a)(2)(A), which “criminaliz[es] the
making of a statement regarding investment tax benefits that an
individual ‘knows or has reason to kno[w] is false or fraudulent
as to any material matter.’”  Id.  The Court noted that those two
statutes “prohibit both ‘false’ and ‘fraudulent’ statements or
information.”  Id.  It then remarked that “[b]ecause the term
‘false statements’ does not imply a materiality requirement . . .
the word ‘material’ limits the statutes’ scope to material
falsehoods.”  Id. (internal citation omitted).
The Neder Court’s comments indicate that it read the
phrase “false or fraudulent” in a way that gave the two
disjunctively connected terms separate meanings.  If, as the
Appellants suggest, the use of the phrase “false or fraudulent”
were sufficient, by itself, to always require proof of materiality,
then the Neder Court’s statement that “the word ‘material’ limits
the statutes’ scope to material falsehoods” would be
nonsensical; the scope of the statutes mentioned in Neder
already would be implicitly limited to material falsehood even
We acknowledge that prior to Neder, the courts of2
appeals were split on the issue of whether materiality was a
required element of Section 287.  See United States v. Nash,
175 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 1999) (identifying four courts that
had held that materiality was not an element of Section 287, and
two courts that had held that it was).  We do not believe,
however, that the presence of this split indicates that textual
ambiguity exists.  As we explained earlier, Neder strongly
suggested that the phrase “false or fraudulent” should be read
in the disjunctive, with only the term “fraudulent” implying a
materiality requirement.  See 527 U.S. at 23 n.7.  This authority
reinforces what is already plain—that the terms “false,”
“fictitious,” and “fraudulent” in Section 287 should be read
separately.  Indeed, in the only post-Neder precedential opinion
11
without the word “material.”  Therefore, in Neder, the Court
must have given the disjunctively connected terms “false” and
“fraudulent” separate meanings.  Such a reading is consistent
with our reading of the similar “false, fictitious, or fraudulent”
language found in Section 287.
The Appellants rely on legislative history to show that
Section 287 always requires proof of materiality.  But we “look
to legislative history only if the text is ambiguous.”  In re Mehta,
310 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2002); see also United States v.
Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 744 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[I]f the statutory
language is clear, it is not necessary to glean congressional
intent from legislative history.”).  Here, we see no textual
ambiguity, nor have the Appellants identified any.2
that we are aware of that has decided whether materiality is an
essential element of Section 287, the Court held that it was not.
See United States v. Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 358 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Appellants argue that United States v. McNally, 4833
U.S. 350 (1987), and United States v. Thomas, 315 F.3d 190
(3d Cir. 2002), justify consideration of legislative history here.
We disagree.  It is true that the courts in both McNally and
Thomas consulted legislative history to discern the meaning of
disjunctively worded statutes.  See McNally, 483 U.S. at 356–58
(discussing the legislative history of the 1872 version of the
federal mail fraud statute and its amendment in 1909); Thomas,
315 F.3d at 197 (“[W]e have plumbed the Congressional
history.”).  Textual ambiguity, however, existed in the statutes
at issue in both of those cases.  See McNally, 483 U.S. at
359–60 (characterizing the federal mail fraud statute as having
“two rational readings”), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat.
4508 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346), as recognized in
United States v. Cleveland, 531 U.S. 12, 19–20 (2000);
Thomas, 315 F.3d at 196 (noting that “[t]his court has spoken
equivocally on” whether the two subsections should be read
disjunctively).  Accordingly, McNally and Thomas do not
compel consideration of legislative history where, as here, the
statute is unambiguous.
The Appellants also claim that the analytical framework
employed in Wells requires us to examine Section 287’s
legislative history.  It does not.  In Wells, the Court considered
12
Accordingly, resort to legislative history is inappropriate.3
the legislative history of the statute before it and noted that the
legislative history “confirm[ed] the natural reading.”  519 U.S.
at 492.  But nothing in Wells suggests that its discussion of
legislative history was an essential analytical step.  To the
contrary, in Neder, the Court employed “the framework set forth
in [Wells]” and made no mention of legislative history.  527
U.S. at 20.  Like our approach here, the Court’s analysis in
Neder was grounded entirely in the statutory language: after
quickly pointing out that the text did not expressly include
materiality, the Court moved to the “necessary second step” of
determining whether the terms used “have accumulated settled
meaning under the common law [such that] a court must infer,
unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to
incorporate the established meaning of these terms.”  Id. at
20–21 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  Accordingly,
the interpretive framework set forth in Wells does not require
that we consult legislative history where statutory text is
unambiguous.
13
In conclusion, Section 287’s clear and unambiguous text
is dispositive: because the terms “false,” “fictitious,” and
“fraudulent” are connected with the disjunctive “or,” the terms
must be given separate meaning and thus, proof of materiality is
not necessary to establish a violation of Section 287.
C.
According to Section 286:
Several of our sister circuits have not included4
materiality among the elements necessary to prove a Section
286 violation.  See, e.g., United States v. Dedman, 527 F.3d
577, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e clarify that the elements
necessary for a conviction under § 286 are: (1) the defendant
entered into a conspiracy to obtain payment or allowance of a
claim against a department or agency of the United States; (2)
the claim was false, fictitious, or fraudulent; (3) the defendant
knew or was deliberately ignorant of the claim’s falsity,
fictitiousness, or fraudulence; (4) the defendant knew of the
conspiracy and intended to join it; and (5) the defendant
voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.”).  We are not aware
of any case from our sister circuits, however, that has squarely
addressed whether Section 286 requires proof of materiality.
Accordingly, we treat this issue as one of first impression.
14
Whoever enters into any agreement, combination,
or conspiracy to defraud the United States, or any
department or agency thereof, by obtaining or
aiding to obtain the payment or allowance of any
false, fictitious or fraudulent claim, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.
The Appellants argue that since Section 286 expressly
provides that the conspiracy must be “to defraud,” proof of
materiality is required to establish a Section 286 violation.4
Clearly, Section 286 does not require proof that any material
falsehoods were actually made or presented.  “[T]he common
15
law understanding of conspiracy ‘does not make the doing of
any act other than the act of conspiring a condition of liability.’”
United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1994) (quoting
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913)).  Nor does
Section 286’s text require any proof of overt acts.  Accordingly,
Section 286 does not require proof that the participants actually
made or presented any falsehoods, let alone any material ones.
Id. at 13 (“[A]bsent contrary indications, Congress intends to
adopt the common law definition of statutory terms.”).
Nonetheless, Section 286 specifies that only conspiracies
with a particular purpose are criminal under the statute: the
conspiracy must be “to defraud.”  Following Neder and Wells,
we must presume that Congress incorporated a materiality
requirement when it used the term “defraud.”  But the
Government argues that no such materiality element is necessary
because Section 286 describes the means through which the
conspiracy to defraud must be accomplished.  According to the
Government, since the intended fraud can be accomplished
through the use of “any false, fictitious or fraudulent claim,”
materiality cannot be a required element.  The Government
asserts that if materiality were required, “false” and “fictitious”
would be rendered surplusage.  We disagree.
The Government is correct that subsequent terms used in
the statute can unmoor “defraud” from its settled common law
meaning.  Indeed, we infer the incorporation of established
common law meanings “unless the statute otherwise dictates.”
We recognize that Section 286 also criminalizes5
conspiracies to defraud by “aiding to obtain the payment or
allowance of any false, fictitious or fraudulent claim . . . .”  This
does not affect our present analysis.  Whether the conspirators
16
Neder, 527 U.S. at 21 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 is
instructive.  Section 371 criminalizes “conspir[acies] . . . to
defraud the United States . . . in any manner or for any purpose
. . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 371.  Although it uses the term “defraud,” the
Court has held that the statute “is not confined to fraud as that
term has been defined in the common law.”  Dennis v. United
States, 384 U.S. 855, 861 (1966).  Instead, “[i]t reaches ‘any
conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing, or
defeating the lawful function of any department of
government[.]’”  Id.  (quoting Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462,
479 (1910)).  Thus, “the meaning of ‘defraud’ must be
interpreted in the context of the particular statute that uses the
term.”  United States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1994).
Nevertheless, the Government’s focus on the phrase
“false, fictitious or fraudulent claims” is incomplete; it ignores
that a Section 286 conspiracy to defraud must be to “obtain[] or
aid[] to obtain the payment or allowance of” such claims.
Because the purpose of a Section 286 conspiracy must be to
obtain payment of a claim, the conspirators must understand, at
least implicitly, that the agreed-upon methods of accomplishing
the fraud are capable of causing the payment of a claim.5
agree to obtain the payment of claims, or agree to merely aid to
obtain the payment of claims, the conspirators must understand
that their agreed-upon actions will lead to the payment of
claims.  See United States v. Soto, 539 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir.
2008) (“‘In order to aid and abet . . . a defendant must do more
than associate with individuals involved in the criminal venture.
(He must) participate in (the criminal enterprise) as something
he wishes to bring about and that he seeks by his action to make
succeed . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Dixon, 658 F.2d 181,
189 (3d Cir. 1981))).
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts §6
538(2), a statement is material if:
(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to
its existence or nonexistence in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in question; or
(b) the maker of the representation knows or has
17
Where, as here, the alleged conspiracy involves the making of
false statements or representations, the conspirators must have
agreed to make statements or representations that would
influence the Government’s decision on whether to pay a claim.
Such statements or representations are, by definition, material.
See Wells, 519 U.S. at 189 (understanding materiality to mean
“‘hav[ing] a natural tendency to influence, or [being] capable of
influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which
it was addressed’” (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.
759, 770 (1988))); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §
538(2) (1977).   Accordingly, where the Government alleges6
reason to know that its recipient regards or is
likely to regard the matter as important in
determining his choice of action, although a
reasonable man would not so regard it.
Of course, “[t]he agreement need not be shown to have7
been explicit.  It can instead be inferred from the facts and
circumstances of the case.”  Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S.
770, 777 n.10 (1975)
18
that the conspirators agreed to make false statements and
representations as part of the conspiracy to defraud, Section 286
requires proof that the conspirators agreed that those statements
or representations would have a material effect on the
Government’s decision to pay a false, fictitious, or fraudulent
claim.7
Our reading is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of a similarly worded statute that was at issue in
Allison Engine Company, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders,
128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008).  There, the Court reviewed a provision
in the False Claims Act that imposed civil liability on any person
who “conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or
fraudulent claim allowed or paid.”  31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3)
(2006), amended by Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(a), 123 Stat. 1621 (2009).  The
Court pointed out that where it was alleged that the conspirators
agreed to make a false record or statement, “it must be shown
19
that the conspirators had the purpose of ‘getting’ the false record
or statement to bring about the Government’s payment of a false
or fraudulent claim.”  128 S. Ct. at 2130.  This meant that “it
must be established that [the conspirators] agreed that the false
record or statement would have a material effect on the
Government’s decision to pay the false or fraudulent claim.”  Id.
at 2130–31.
Here, Section 286’s language concerning the purpose of
the prohibited conspiracy to defraud closely resembles that of
the statute analyzed in Allison Engine.  Compare 18 U.S.C. §
286 (“[B]y obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or
allowance of any false, fictitious or fraudulent claim . . . .”), with
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3) (2006) (“[B]y getting a false or
fraudulent claim allowed or paid.”).  The term “obtain” is
synonymous with “get,” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary
953 (1966); see also id. at 1559 (listing “get” as a synonym of
“obtain”), so we see no substantive difference between the
phrases “obtaining . . . payment or allowance of any false,
fictitious or fraudulent claim” and “getting a false or fraudulent
claim allowed or paid.”  Thus, we read Section 286 in a manner
consistent with Allison Engine: where it is alleged that the
conspirators agreed to make false statements or representations
as part of the conspiracy to defraud, it must be established that
the conspirators agreed that those statements or representations
would have a material effect on the decision to pay a false,
fictitious, or fraudulent claim.
20
Contrary to the Government’s suggestion, our reading of
Section 286 does not render the terms “false” and “fictitious”
surplusage.  Aside from materiality, common law fraud also
requires proof of scienter.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts §
526.  Therefore, conspirators could agree to make materially
false statements or representations in order to obtain payment of
claims that were merely false or fictitious.  For example, the
conspirators could agree to make materially false statements or
representations to an innocent third party, who would then file
claims based on that materially false information.  Since the
innocent third party lacks the necessary scienter, the claims filed
would be merely false or fictitious, but not fraudulent.  Our
reading of Section 286, however, would still subject the
conspirators to criminal liability.
We emphasize that our holding is limited to cases
containing allegations that the conspirators agreed to make false
statements or representations as part of the conspiracy to
defraud.  Section 286’s language leaves open the possibility that
other conspiracies to defraud may be actionable under the
statute; it does not explicitly specify that the conspiracy must
involve an agreement to make false statements or
representations.  Accordingly, we express no view on whether
materiality is a required element of any alleged conspiracies that
do not involve an agreement to make false statements or
representations.
In sum, Section 286 does not require proof that material
We note that Welch, unlike Saybolt, did not challenge8
the Indictment’s sufficiency until after the jury returned a guilty
verdict.  If Welch’s appeal were before us by itself, we would
“construe the factual allegations in the indictment liberally”
because “‘indictments which are tardily challenged are liberally
constructed in favor of validity.’”  United States v. Vitillo, 490
F.3d 314, 324 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Wander,
601 F.2d 1251, 1259 (3d Cir.1979)).  But since Saybolt appeals
the denial of his pre-trial motion to dismiss the Indictment, and
the Indictment charged the Appellants jointly, we will analyze
the Indictment’s sufficiency as if both Appellants had raised the
issue prior to trial.
21
falsehoods were actually made.  But where, as here, it is alleged
that the conspirators agreed to make false statements or
representations as part of the conspiracy, we read Section 286 to
require proof that the conspirators agreed that these statements
or representations would have a material effect on the decision
to pay a false, fictitious, or fraudulent claim.
III.
Having determined that materiality is not an essential
element of a Section 287 violation, but is an element for the type
of Section 286 violation charged in this case, we must review
the Indictment to determine whether it was sufficient.   “We8
deem an indictment sufficient so long as it ‘(1) contains the
elements of the offense intended to be charged, (2) sufficiently
apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and
22
(3) allows the defendant to show with accuracy to what extent
he may plead a former acquittal or conviction in the event of a
subsequent prosecution.’” United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257,
280 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d
314, 321 (3d Cir.2007)).  The Appellants claim that the absence
of the term “material” from the text of the Indictment renders it
insufficient.  We disagree.
An indictment’s “primary office” is “to inform the
defendant of the nature of the accusation against him.”  Russell
v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 767 (1962).  This is
accomplished by identifying the law that is alleged to have been
violated and including factual allegations that sufficiently
apprise the defendant of the offending conduct.  See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 7(c) (“The indictment or information must be a plain,
concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense charged . . . .  For each count, the
indictment or information must give the official or customary
citation of the . . . provision of law that the defendant is alleged
to have violated.”); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87,
117–18 (1974) (“‘Undoubtedly, the language of the statute may
be used in the general description of an offense, but it must be
accompanied with such a statement of the facts and
circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense,
coming under the general description, with which he is
charged.’”  (quoting United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487
(1888))).  As we have held, “‘no greater specificity than the
statutory language is required so long as there is sufficient
23
factual orientation to permit the defendant to prepare his defense
and to invoke double jeopardy in the event of a subsequent
prosecution.’” Kemp, 500 F.3d at 280 (quoting United States v.
Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 112 (3d Cir.1989)).  Accordingly, “an
allegation of fraud in an indictment will be sufficient so long as
the facts alleged in the indictment warrant an inference that the
false statement is material.”  United States v. Creech, 408 F.3d
264, 269 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citation
omitted); see also United States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526, 532
(6th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Ladum, 141 F.3d 1328,
1334 (9th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d
1287, 1292 n.6 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that the indictment was
not defective for failing to use the word “materiality” because
“sufficient facts are alleged to establish materiality . . .”);
United States v. Kirby, 587 F.2d 876, 882 (7th Cir. 1978)
(rejecting a claim that the indictment was insufficient for failing
to allege materiality because, based on the facts alleged, “[t]he
materiality of the false statements is self-apparent . . .”);
Gonzalez v. United States, 286 F.2d 118, 121 (10th Cir. 1960)
(“When the words of a statute do not fully, directly and
expressly set forth all of the essential elements constituting the
offense described, allegations in the words of the statute are
insufficient, but allegations of fact which show materiality will
suffice.”), abrogated on other grounds by United States v.
Daily, 921 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1990).
Here, it is clear that despite its failure to use the word
“materiality,” the Indictment sufficiently alleged facts that
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warrant an inference that the false statements the conspirators
agreed to make were material.  First, the Indictment alleged that
the Appellants “recruited people to give them their own or a
third party’s identification so that defendant WELCH could
generate fraudulent individual tax returns falsely claiming tax
refunds from the I.R.S., using, in part, that information.”
Second, the Indictment specified that the Appellants requested
“name[s], address[es], date[s] of birth and social security
number[s].”  Third, the Indictment charged the Appellants with
stating “that a fictional employer . . . had withheld too much
money and that each taxpayer was entitled to a refund of federal
wage taxes already paid,” and “misrepresent[ing] the identified
taxpayer to be a fisherman or a farmer and falsely claim[ing]
that the taxpayer was entitled to refunds for federal excise taxes
falsely claimed to have been paid on off-road uses of gasoline
in their fishing and farming businesses.”  Fourth, the Indictment
identified each of the filed tax returns that contained the alleged
falsities.  These factual allegations suggest that the Appellants
agreed to file tax returns that misrepresented the identity of the
individuals claiming a refund, the reasons for the refund, and the
amount of the refund.  Such falsities are undoubtedly “‘capable
of influencing . . . the decision of the decisionmaking body to
which it was addressed.’”  Wells, 519 U.S. at 189 (quoting
Kungys, 485 U.S. at 770).  As a result, the Indictment was
sufficient because it alleged facts warranting an inference that
the Appellants agreed to make materially false statements as part
of their conspiracy to defraud the IRS.
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IV.
The final issue we must address is whether Welch is
entitled to a new trial because the District Court did not instruct
the jury that the Section 286 violation charged in this case
required proof of materiality.  Our review is for harmless error.
Neder, 527 U.S. at 15 (concluding that “the omission of an
element [in a jury instruction] is an error that is subject to
harmless-error analysis”).  An error is harmless when “it appears
‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Id.  Here, it is clear that the
District Court’s failure to instruct the jury on materiality was
harmless error.  Welch admits that the tax forms submitted to the
IRS misrepresented individual and business names, addresses,
employment information, gross income, and business
expenditures.  These misrepresentations are unquestionably
material.  Id. at 16 (“In general, a false statement is material if
it has ‘a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of
influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which
it was addressed.’”  (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.
506, 509 (1995)).  Therefore, Welch is not entitled to a new
trial; it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that, even with an
instruction on materiality, the jury would have found that Welch
agreed to make materially false statements as part of the
conspiracy to defraud the IRS.
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V.
We hold that Section 287 does not require proof of
materiality.  But where, as here, the alleged Section 286
conspiracy involves the making of false statements or
representations, Section 286 requires proof that the conspirators
agreed that those statements or representations would have a
material effect on the decision to pay a false, fictitious, or
fraudulent claim.  Here, the Indictment did not use the term
“material,” nor was the jury instructed on Section 286’s
materiality requirement.  Nonetheless, the Appellants are not
entitled to a new trial.  Since the factual allegations contained in
the Indictment warrant an inference of materiality, the absence
of the word “material” does not render it insufficient.
Additionally, the District Court’s failure to instruct the jury on
materiality is harmless error because the evidence shows beyond
a reasonable doubt that the conspirators agreed to make
materially false statements as part of the conspiracy.  Therefore,
we will affirm the Appellants’ convictions and sentences.
